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The Contractual Aspect of Consumer Protection: Recent
Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties
Because consumer protection is an important aspect of the economics of production and distribution, it is hardly surprising that
significant changes throughout the years in our system of marketing
have been accompanied by corresponding developments in our law
of products liability. Traditionally, the most common form of redress for an injury caused by a defective product has been a suit
against the seller of the offending merchandise for breach of warranty.
A warranty action originally sounded in tort; however, a warranty
itself-a seller's express or implied representation concerning the
quality of his goods-soon took on the character of an element of
the contract under which a product was sold. This development accounts for the existence of those features which today distinguish
suits for breach of warranty from actions based on negligence or
fraud. 1 Modern warranty recovery is not premised on a warrantor's
subjective fault, but rather on his absolute liability for a breach of
promise-the implied promise to his buyer that the quality of particular goods would be as represented. 2 Therefore, an injured party
suing on a warranty theory is spared the often difficult task of proving the seller's negligence. On the other hand, the contractual nature
of a warranty injects into an action for breach of warranty the ageold complexities of contract law, with the result that many obstacles
dot the injured purchaser's path to recovery. On balance, however,
the history of the law of warranty has been one of continual progress
away from the concept of caveat emptor toward that of greater consumer protection.3 This transition is largely attributable to the willingness of courts to modify or circumvent the traditional applications of a number of contract-law principles in an effort to develop
a warranty theory adapted to the needs of a commercial community
where a buyer frequently cannot inspect the goods that he purchases
(or, if he can examine them, does not have the specialized knowledge
necessary to detect their defects) and where a product may pass
through the hands of several persons before it reaches an ultimate
user, who may or may not be a purchaser.
As might have been expected, the courts have not confined their
efforts in updating the law of products liability to fostering innova1. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 CoLUM, L. REV. 699 (1936).
2. 1 Wn.usroN, SALES § 237 (1948 ed.).
3. "The nineteenth-century policy of protecting young manufacturers is now giving
way to one of protecting innocent consumers from unexpected injuries or losses due
to defective products over which they have no control." Picker X-ray Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919, 921 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1962); see Jaeger, Warranties
of Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments, 16 RUTGERS L. REV.
493, 494-503 (1962). For a comparison with the development of civil law, see Kessler,
The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, 74 YALE L.J. 262 (1964).
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tions in that segment dealing with warranties. The struggle to impose strict tort liability upon a manufacturer for harm caused by his
defective products has made significant advances and is continuing:'
However, the citadel has yet to be taken. Indeed, even the California
Supreme Court, which may be considered the leading proponent of
this strict tort theory, has limited its availability so that only those
seeking redress for harm to person or property may invoke the doctrine; thus, a plaintiff hoping to recover for a purely economic loss
is restricted to an action for breach of warranty. 5 It thus appears that
the warranty theory will continue to play a major role in consumer
protection. This Comment will treat some of the more recent developments relating to the warranty theory, of which perhaps the most
significant are the changes wrought by the Uniform Commercial
Code, which has been adopted by the legislatures in an overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions.6
I.

TYPES OF WARRANTIES

A warranty is often formally defined as
a statement or representation made by the seller of goods
contemporaneously with, and as a part of, the contract of sale,
although collateral to the express object of it, having reference
to the character, quality, or title of the goods, and by which he
promises or undertakes to insure that certain facts are or shall
be as he represents them. 7
Warranties are generally classified as either express (those based
4. Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1
(1963); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel: Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
5. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965), where
Chief Justice Traynor remarked: "The law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern the economic relations between suppliers and consumers of goods.
The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed,
not to undermine the warranty provisions of the Sales Act or the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries." 45
Cal. Rptr. at 21, 403 P.2d at 149. But see Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d
612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Santor v. A &: M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d
305 (1965).
6. The Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.] provisions concerned with sales warranties are §§ 2-312 to -318, 2-715, -718, -719. Each Code section
is followed by an official comment, written by someone associated with the drafting
of that provision, apparently designed to clarify the draftsmen's intent. Section 1-102(£)
of the 1952 edition of the Code stated that these comments were to be consulted by
courts construing and applying the act, but no similar provision appears in later
editions. The comments do not represent the law; however, since a legislature should
be presumed to have been aware of their exfatence when it enacted the Code, they
may be considered to have the weight of legislative history. See FARNSWORTH &: HONNOLD, COMMERCIAL LAW 7-10 (1965).
7. 77 C.J.S. Sales § 301, at 1115 (1952), quoted with approval in Mitchell v. Rudasill, 332 S.W.2d 91, 94-95 (Mo. App. 1960); see Jaeger, Products Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 NOTRE DAME LAw. 501, 506 (1964).
-
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upon actual representations made by a seller) or implied (those
attributable to representations arising by operation of law from the
nature of a particular transaction).

A. Express Warranties
The Uniform Sales Act, 8 the basic statutory guide to the law of
the marketplace before the advent of the Uniform Commercial
Code, defined an express warranty as "any affirmation of fact or any
promise by the seller relating to the goods . . . if the natural
tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer
to purchase the goods, and the buyer purchases the goods relying
thereon." 9
Section 2-313(l)(a), the corresponding provision of the Code, defines an express warranty in a similar manner: "Any affirmation of
fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise."
Section 2-313(l)(b) provides that "any description of the goods which
is made a part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the description," and section 2-313
(l)(c) states that "any sample or model which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of
the goods shall conform to the sample or model."
The Code requirement that in order to create an express warranty, an affirmation or promise must be part of the basis of a bargain-a phrase which has been said to mean that a particular representation could reasonably have induced a buyer to act10-seems to
have been intended to be largely equivalent to the Sales Act principle that in order to give rise to an express warranty, a representation must have had a natural tendency to induce a buyer to purchase.
However, by not explicitly requiring a plaintiff-buyer to show that
he relied upon a particular allegedly inaccurate representation, the
draftsmen of the Code may have intended to place upon the seller
the burden of demonstrating that the affirmation or the promise was
not part of a particular agreement.11 Under the Sales Act, the burden
theoretically rested on a buyer to establish that he had relied on a
seller's representations.12 Nevertheless, in practice it was often suffi8. The Uniform Sales Act [hereinafter cited as U.S.A.] was drafted in 1906 and
was largely the work of Professor Samuel Williston. In many of its sections the Uniform
Sales Act followed very closely the British Sale of Goods Act of 1893. Although it is
rapidly being replaced by the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Sales Act was
once the law of thirty American jurisdictions. F ARNSWORTII &: HONNOLD, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 5.
9. U.S.A. § 12.
10. HAWK.LAND, TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 58 (1964),
11. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 3.
12. Pedroli v. Russell, 157 Cal. App. 2d 281, ~20 P.2d 873 (1958); Midland Loan
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dent for a buyer to show only that the representations were of a
kind which naturally would have induced him to purchase and that
he did purchase goods concerning which the representations had
been made.13 Thus, despite its change in language, the Code appears
to effect little change in the law.
·
Code section 2-209(1) provides that once a contract has· been
made, it may be modified by agreement of the parties, even though
no additional consideration passes between them. Relying upon this
provision, the writers of the official explanatory comment to section
2-313 stated that the "precise time · when words of description or
affirmation are made or samples are shown is not material," 14 and
thereby left the impression that express warranties may arise out of
statements which become known to a purchaser only after a transaction has been completed. For example, a buyer may purchase a
factory-packaged drill bit in a transaction in which no express warranties were created at the time of sale, and then, upon opening
the box in his home and reading the enclosed instructions, discovers
that they clearly indicate that the bit will cut through concrete. The
comment to section 2-313 suggests that if the tool 1Vill not in fact
make a hole in concrete, he could recover damages for breach of an
express warranty, although the statement inside the package did not
in any way induce him to buy the bit. However, this result would be
impossible to reconcile with the requirement in section 2-313(1) that
language creating an express warranty must be a part of the basis of
a bargain. If, on the other hand, the purchaser of the drill bit had
extracted an: additional promise from his seller after the sale that
the bit would cut through concrete, section 2-209(1) would probably
operate to effect a modification of the contract by agreement to include an obligation on the part of the seller similar to that which
would have arisen had the seller expressly warranted the product's
capability prior to the sale. In any event, a buyer's post-sale discovery
of a statement inside a package may have some legal significance. I£
the buyer relied on the representation in using the product and was
injured because the statement proved to have been untrue, ·the seller
could be liable on a tort theory of misrepresentation.15
Section 2-313(2) codifies a common-law concept by providing that
"an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the
goods does not create a warranty." 16 This idea is probably already
Fin. Co. v. Madsen, 217 Minn. 267, 14 N.W.2d 475 (1944); Lewitus v. Brown & Seccomb,
228 App. Div. 146, 239 N.Y. Supp. 261 (1930).
,
•

I

13. Steiner v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. Super. 869, 280 P.2d 235 (Super. Ct. 1955); 1 WILLIS•
TON, SALF.5 534-35 (1948 ed.).
14. U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 7.
15. See PROSSER, TORTS 729 (1964).
16. U.S.A. § 12 provided: "No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any state-
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inherent in the requirement of section 2-313(1) that a statement
must be part of the basis of a bargain to create an express warranty,
because statements of the kind mentioned in section 2-313(2), commonly characterized as "puffing" or "dealer's talk," would not usu- ·
ally induce a reasonable buyer to act. Of course, even if a particular
representation does not create an express warranty, it may form the
basis for an action for fraud or misrepresentation.17
A major change effected by section 2-313(1) relates to warranties
of "description" and "sample." A warranty of description arises
under the Code, as it did under the Sales Act, when a sale is made
on the basis of a seller's description of particular goods; the warranty
is breached if the merchandise does not conform to that description.
Under the Sales Act, a warranty of this type was designated an implied warranty. 18 Often, however, the descriptive words upon which
a warranty of description was founded could also be taken as affirmations of the kind creating an express warranty, thereby providing a
disappointed buyer with a choice of warranty theories upon which
to seek relief. Although there appears to have been no reason why
express and implied warranties should have been treated as mutually
exclusive, courts persisted in attempting to fit particular descriptive
words into one category or the other.19 Classifying descriptive words
either as affirmations of fact creating an express warranty or as simple words of description giving rise to an implied warranty was often
difficult under the Sales Act; however, such a determination was rarely
important. Proper categorization could have affected the outcome of
a case only when the sale leading to the litigation had been one in
which the seller had successfully disclaimed the existence of all implied warranties but had not effectively protected himself from the
express warranty liability created by the descriptive words. 20 The
Code resolves any dispute which may arise concerning the proper
classification of descriptive words in favor of the express warranty
label; consequently, any attempt to disclaim the existence of warranties of description will probably prove ineffective because section
2-316(1) invalidates a purported disclaimer in so far as it is inconsistent with the terms of any express warranty. 21
ment purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as
a warranty." See Shay v. Joseph, 219 Md. 279, 149 A.2d 3 (1959); Brown v. Globe Labs.,
Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957); I WILLISTON, SALES § 202 (1948 ed.).
17. See generally Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negli•
gence, and Strict Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1350, 1351-55 (1966).
18. U.S.A. § 14.
19. HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note IO, at 60.
20. See Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817 (3d Cir.
1951).
21. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 4. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) provides: "Words or conduct
relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to negate
or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each
other; but •.• negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable." See text accompanying note 126 infra.
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Under the Sales Act, when a seller displayed a sample or a model
purporting to depict the nature and quality of certain goods, and a
buyer then purchased merchandise in reliance upon what he had
seen, there arose an implied warranty "of sample" that the goods
would correspond to the representations. 22 This type of warranty
also exists under the Code, but is classified as an express warranty;
therefore, if a seller shows a sample which becomes the basis of a
bargain between him and his customer, the result could be the same
as if he had expressly stated that the goods which the sample supposedly represented would conform to it. The existence of a warranty "of sample" in a Code jurisdiction is premised upon the fact
that a sample or a model was intended to represent, or to be of the·
character of, the goods on sale. However, occasionally an article
shown to a buyer may be meant merely to suggest the character of the
merchandise. In this case, the sample or model would probably not
be the basis of any resulting bargain and thus would not normally
give rise to an express warranty.23 A similar outcome would have
followed from the law as it developed in most Sales Act jurisdictions. 24
Under the Code, an express warranty is supposed to be the result
of "dickering" between a buyer and a seller.25 However, the official
comment to section 2-313 suggests that the Code's draftsmen felt that
no specific intention on the part of a seller to make an express warranty should be necessary in order for his conduct to give rise to
one.26 The widespread enactment of the Code should therefore encourage courts to rely upon those cases in which sellers have been
held liable to purchasers on an express warranty theory when merchandise did not measure up to the claims, even those that did not
rise to the level of descriptions, made for it in advertisements and
sales literature and on product labels.27

B. Implied Warranties
1. Merchantability

The most significant implied warranty arising from a sale of
goods is that of merchantability. Section 15(2) of the Sales Act stated
that "where the goods are bought by description from a seller who
22. U.S.A. § 16.
23. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 6.
,
24. See Somerville Container Sales v. General Metal Corp., 39 N.J. Super. 348, 120
A.2d 866 (App. Div.), modified, 39 N.J. Super. 562, 121 A.2d '746 (App. Div. 1956).
25. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 1.
26. U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 3.
27. Pritchard v. Liggett &: Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965); Smith
v. Gates Rubber Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 307 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Randy Knitwear
Inc. v. American Cyanamide Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962);
Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965). For the
effect of the Code on the question of privity, see text accompanying note 108 infra.
1
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deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall
be of merchantable quality." When it was drafted, this provision
was declaratory of the law in all states except those in which courts
drew a distinction between sellers who were also manufacturers and
those who were simply dealers and held that only transactions involving the former type of merchant gave rise to implied warranties of
merchantability.2s
,
While an implied warranty of merchantability arose under the
Sales Act only if a seller dealt in merchandise similar to that actually sold, in a Code jurisdiction such a warranty grows out of a sale
if the seller, is a "merchant" with respect to the goods involved. It
might seem that section 2-314 is more inclusive than its Sales Act
counterpart, since section 2-104(1) defines a merchant as a person
who deals in goods of a particular kind or otherwise holds himself
out as someone having "knowledge or skill peculiar to the [commercial] practices or goods" involved in a given transaction. However, the comment to section 2-31~, the provision specifically dealing with the warranty of merchantability, suggests that the term
"merchant" as used in this section was intended to have a slightly
more restricted meaning; the comment indicates that no warranty
of this type arises when a person makes an "isolated sale of goods." 20
It would thus appear that no warranty of merchantability would
grow out of a transaction such as a sale by an automobile mechanic
of his own car, despite the fact that he possesses "knowledge or skill
peculiar to the ... goods." This result would be entirely reasonable,
because a mechanic does not have an adequate knowledge of sales
law to be competent to appreciate the extent of an obligation imposed by a warranty of merchantability and to protect himself by
effectively disclaiming warranty liability. Moreover, he would be
unable to distribute among a host of customers the financial burden
which would be imposed if he breached such an obligation.Bo Of
course, even an individual making an isolated sale has a duty to deal
in good faith and must therefore disclose to his buyer the existence
of any material but hidden defect of which the seller is aware.B1
Code section 2-314 contains some important advances over section 15(2) of the Sales Act. The older provision did not define the
term "merchantable quality," but most courts held that a product
met this description if it was "fit for the general purpose for which
28. See Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 517, 235 S.W.2d 988, 990 (1951); Bochcck Constr. Equip. Corp. v. H. Fuller & Sons, Inc., 19 Wis. 2d 658, 662, 121 N.W.2d 303, 306
(1963). For cases making a distinction between a dealer and a manufacturer-seller, see
, 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 232 (1948 ed.).
29. U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 3.
30. HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 10, at 70.
31. u.c.c. § 1-203.

May 1966]

Sales Warranties

1437

[it was] manufactured and sold,''32 or was "suitable for the ordinary
use for which [it was] sold."33 A few courts simply said that a product was unmerchantable if it was "unsalable."34 On the other hand,
section 2-314(2) provides a comprehensive but nonexclusive definition of the word "merchantable,"35 the most important aspect of
which, from the consumer purchaser's point of view, is the codification of the rule followed by those courts that took the position that
particular goods were merchantable if they were fit for the purposes
for which they were ordinarily used. 36 The Code further states in
section 2-314(2)(a), however, that goods are merchantable only if
they would "pass without objection in the trade." 37 If this language
was intended to mean that a warranty of merchantability is breached
whenever a buyer objects to the quality of merchandise sold to him,
it would suggest a greatly expanded concept of the nature of the
protection afforded by this type of warranty.38 Apparently no cases
have yet interpreted this phrase, and the official comment to section
2-314 is of little help in discovering the draftsmen's intent, beyond
a suggestion that the words in question are to be read together with
section 2-314(2)(b), a provision indicating that fungible goods are
merchantable only if they are of "fair average quality."39 Because
fungible goods are usually associated with tra11sactions between commercial parties, the comment raises the possibility that the "pass
without objection in the trade" test was designed to be applicable
only in the context of commercial dealings and that it has no relevance in the setting of consumer sales. On the other hand, perhaps
the troublesome language will eventually be construed to mean
32. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,.32 N.J. 358, 370, 161 A.2d 69, 76 (1960).
33. Vincent v. Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 729, 151 N.E.2d 263, 265
(1958); Mead v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440, 442, 108 N.E.2d 757, 758 (1953).
34. Moore v. Hubbard & Johnson Lumber Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 236, 241, 308 P.2d
794, 797 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
35. U.C.C. § 2-314 provides:
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
·
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
The accompanying explanatory comment suggests that these tests were not meant
to be all-inclusive. U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 6.
36. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c), set out in note 35 supra.
37. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a), set out in note 35 supra.
38. Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of
Sales, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 281, 293 (1951).
39. U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 7. Fungible goods are defined by the U.C.C. as those
"of which any unit is, by nature or usage of trade, the equivalent of any other like
unit.'' U.C.C. § 1-201(17).
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nothing more than that the testimony of one who has dealt with
merchandise of the type giving rise to a dispute will be admissible,
as it traditionally has been, to aid in determining whether a particular product would have been acceptable for resale "in the
trade."40
The Code makes an important addition to the standard of merchantability by requiring that goods must "conform to [any] ..•
promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label."41
This provision would seem to afford increased consumer protection
by rejecting the "adoption rule," which shielded a retailer from
liability for having sold a product.not measuring up to the manufacturer's claims printed on the package unless the dealer, by conduct
other than simply stocking the merchandise, had "adopted" such
claims as his own representations.42 However, this provision may
have less significance at present than it would have had a few years
ago,. because the trend among courts today is toward allowing a consumer purchaser to sue a manufacturer for breach of an express
warranty created by statements on a container of a factory-packaged
product, despite a lack of privity of contract between the plaintiff
and the producer.43
Under the Sales Act, a sale must have been "by description" in
order for an implied warranty of merchantability to arise. Although
the term "by description" was not defined in the act, courts regularly held that there had been no sale by description, and therefore
no warranty of merchantability accompanying the transfer of title,
if a buyer had selected specific goods.44 Where the Code is in effect, the "description rule" no longer exists; the only general requirement which must be met in order for an implied warranty of
merchantability to grow out of a sale of goods is that the seller be
"a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." 45 The Code's rejection of the old principle should have the effect of extending the
benefit of the warranty of merchantability to more consumer buyers,
who usually choose specific goods from a shelf, as opposed to commercial or industrial purchasers, who are inclined to order merchandise by general description or, at most, by trade name.46 Neverthe40. See generally 1 FRUMER & FruEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.02[1] (1965).
41. u.c.c. § 2-314(2)(£).
42. HAwKLAND, op. cit. supra note 10, at 69-70. See generally Cochran v. McDonald,
23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945).
43. See text accompanying note 102 infra.
44. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 230 (1948 ed.).
45. u.c.c. § 2-314(1).
46. Even before the advent of the Code, some courts had already expanded the
scope of "sale by description" to include specific goods. See Kohn v. Ball, 36 Tenn,
App. 281, 286, 254 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1953): "The term sale by description strictly
means an executory sale where the article is not present, but the term has been
broadened to include all sales, whether or not the goods are present, where there is
no adequate opportunity for inspection."
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less, even in a Code jurisdiction, a buyer of specific goods may make
himself ineligible for the protection- of the implied warranty of
merchantability. Section 2-316(3)(b) states that "when the buyer
before entering into the contract [of sale] has examined the goods
. . . or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him." However, the official comment to this section suggests that a consumer purchaser is given
some protection by the fact that a "particular buyer's skill and the
normal method of examining goods in the circumstances determine
what defects are excluded [from the scope of the warranty coverage]
by the examination."47

2. Implied Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose
Sales of goods often give rise to a second type of implied warranty, that of fitness for a particular purpose. In language expressive
of the common law in the early twentieth century,48 the Sales Act
stated in sections 15(1) and (4):
Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known
to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill
or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or
not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.... In the case of a contract to
sell or a sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade
name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any
particular purpose.
Section 2-315 of the Code provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required
and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment
to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
The most significant change effected by this Code section is the
rejection of the "patent or trade name" rule, codified by the Sales
Act, by which no warranty of fitness for a particular purpose attached
to the sale of merchandise requested by its brand name. Apparently,
it was presumed as a matter of law that a buyer who knew enough
about a product to ask for it .by its trade name was not relying on
a seller's judgment to select goods capable of fulfilling a special
47. U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 8; see text accompanying note 137 infra.
48. See McNabb v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 272 Ky. 112, 113 S.W.2d 470 (1938);
Child's Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler, 173 Md. 490, 197 Atl. 105 (1938).
.
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need.49 In a Code jurisdiction, the existence of a warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose is always a question of fact and depends
only upon a finding, from all the circumstances surrounding a given
sale, both that the seller of the goods in question had reason to
know the buyer's intended use for them (although the seller need
not have had actual knowledge) and also that the buyer did in fact ,
rely upon the seller's judgment in choosing a product to fulfill that
purpose. A purchaser's asking for a product by its brand name is
no longer conclusive evidence that no warranty of this type accompanied a sale, but merely serves as some indication that he did not
rely upon the seller's judgment.50 In an attempt to mitigate the
harshness of the "trade name rule," a few courts applied a similar
principle in Sales Act cases in which, after a seller had recommended a particular brand of merchandise to fulfill a special purpose, a buyer ordered it by its trade name. 51 The Code approach is
certainly reasonable in an age when many products are regularly
identified by trade name and when a plaintiff may have been induced to ask for a brand-name item by a defendant's own assurances
in his advertising that it would serve a particular purpose.
It appears that both a warranty of merchantability and one of
fitness for a particular purpose may grow out of the same sale,li2
For example, a purchaser buying an automobile with the special
intention of entering a stock car race might reasonably anticipate
that the car will also be suitable as a means of ordinary transportation. Since the latter is the ordinary purpose for which automobiles
are sold, his expectation in this regard is protected by an implied
warranty of merchantability. 53 In addition, if the seller knew of the
buyer's special intended use and if the purchaser relied upon the
seller to furnish a vehicle fit for that use, an implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose would also arise.
Some courts have even reasoned that a warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose is created automatically by the mere sale of an
article which has only one ordinary use. 54 For example, in Kirh v.
Stineway Drug Store Co.,55 where plaintiff had been injured while
climbing a stepladder, the court found an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose accompanying the sale of the ladder,
49. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 286a (1948 ed.).
50. See U.C.C. § 2-315, comments 1 and 5.
51. See Buchanan v. Ducan, 82 A.2d 911 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1951); Green Mountain
Mushroom Co. v. Brown, 117 Vt. 509, 95 A.2d 679 (1953).
52. See U.C.C. § 2-315, comment 2; HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 10, at 68,
53. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
54. Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149, 152 (9th. Cir. 1962) (hula skirts); Kirk v.
Stineway Drug Store Co., 38 Ill. App. 2d 415, 422, 187 N.E.2d 307, 310 (1963) (steplad•
der); Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 612, 187 A.2d 575, 576•77 (1963)
(soda water).
55. 38 Ill. App. 2d 415, 187 N.E.2d 307 (1963) (decided under the Sales Act).
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although the purchaser had not made known to the seller the exact
use for which the article was desired. The court reasoned that since
a stepladder is invariably purchased in order that a buyer may elevate himself, this purpose is impliedly made known to a seller by
the very nature of the article sold. 56 However, because the term "particular purpose" envisages a specific use peculiar to a certain
buyer,51 it would have been better for the court to speak in terms
of a warranty of merchantability rather than finding an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose just because the product
had only one ordinary use. 58
The distinction benveen these two kinds of implied warranties
becomes important under the Code only in determining the consequences of a seller's attempt to disclaim the existence of either or
both types in connection with a particular sale. In some circumstances section 2-316 requires that disclaimer of liability on a warranty of merchantability, in order to be effective, must mention the
term "merchantability." On the other hand, a· disclaimer of a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose need not be cast in special
language to be valid, although it must be in writing and conspicuous. 59
3. Title
Section 13 of the Uniform Sales Act provided that every sale of
goods, as well as all contracts to sell goods, gave rise to three implied
warranties of title: (1) that the vendor had a right to sell the goods,
(2) that the buyer would enjoy quiet possession of them, and (3)
that they were, or at the time of the sale would be, free from any
charge or incumbrance in favor of third persons.
The Code has abolished the concept of a specific warranty of
quiet possession. An interference with a buyer's peaceful enjoyment
of purchased goods is apparently intended under the Code to serve
merely as evidence establishing a breach of a vendor's basic warranty-that he had passed good title in connection with the sale. 60
More significant, while under the Sales Act the statute of limitations on a cause of action for breach of a warranty of quiet possession
began to run only when a buyer's possession was actually disturbed, 61 the Code provides that a right to sue for a breach of any
warranty relating to a seller's obligation to co~vey good title accrues
56. Id. at 422, 187 N.E.2d at 310; accord, Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79 Nev.
241, 382 P.2d 399 (1963) (recovery denied because of lack of privity).
57. Davenport Ladder Co. v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 43 F.2d 63, 67 (8th Cir.
1930); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 235 (1948 ed.). See also U.C.C. § 2-315, comment 2.
58. Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 464, 162 A.2d 513, 515
(1960). The court in Kirk found there had been no warranty of merchantability because the plaintiff had had an opportunity to inspect the ladder.
59. See note 128 infra and accompanying text.
60. U.C.C. § 2-312, comment I.
61. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 221 (1948 ed.).
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upon tender of delivery of merchandise, regardless of whether the
aggrieved party then knew of the breach. 62 Coupled with the fact
that the applicable statute of limitations may be reduced to a
period as short as one year by agreement of the parties, 63 this rule
will certainly promote finality in dealings involving commercial
purchasers, the type of transactions with which the Code is primarily concerned. 64 Nevertheless, it may prove unduly harsh to a
consumer buyer who discovers too late that he has received stolen
merchandise.
While it retains the concept of a specific warranty against_ incumbrances, the Code, in section 2-312(3), also provides that a seller impliedly warrants that his goods will be taken free of any third person's rightful claim for "infringement." However, this additional
guarantee should be of little concern to an average consumer, because it apparently has reference to outstanding patent or trademark
claims which could prevent a buyer from reselling merchandise.611
II.

THE CONCEPT OF PRIVITY

A warranty is essentially a representation, either express or implied, regarding the quality of, or title to, particular merchandise.
It becomes a part of a sales agreement either because the parties to
the transaction choose to incorporate it or because the law automatically reads it into their contract. 66 Since a warranty is thus an
element of a contract, the prevailing rule is that a person may recover for its breach only if he is actually privy to the agreement.07
Therefore, a consumer purchasing from a retailer, who in turn received the goods from their manufacturer, would be unable to sue
the manufacturer for breach of any warranty, express or implied,
arising out of the manufacturer's sale to the retailer. Nevertheless,
many times a plaintiff wishes to sue a manufacturer or some member
of a distributive chain besides his immediate seller, in order to reach
the party most financially capable of compensating him for the losses
he suffered by reason of a defect in a product.
Before the industrial revolution, the privity concept was of little
significance in the warranty context because a consumer usually
bought a product directly from its manufacturer and was therefore
in actual privity with the only party conceivably responsible for
any injuries attributable to defective merchandise. 68 In those relatively few instances where a buyer purchased goods through a dealer,
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

U.C.C. § 2-725(2); see U.C.C. § 2-312, comment 1.
u.c.c. § 2-725(1). .
See generally U.C.C. § 1-102.
See U.C.C. § 2-312, comment 3.
Dunn v. Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 84 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tex, Civ, App. 1985),
See 1 CORBIN, CoNTRACIS § 124 (1963 ed.); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 244 (1948 ed.).
Ezer, supra note 38, at 322,
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the latter was probably more affluent than the manufacturer and
thus better able to bear any loss occasioned by a defective product.69
However, when the marketing structure was revolutionized during
the last century, it became increasingly necessary for a buyer injured
by substandard merchandise to look beyond his immediate· seller
(normally the neighborhood retailer) in order to find someone capable of adequately compensating him; the privity rule hindered his
effort. Apart from traditional considerations of contract law and a
desire to protect infant industries, 70 an important rationale for the
continued vitality of the privity rule in breach of warranty actions
was the feeling that a manufacturer who had made a representation
to his buyer-a distributor or a retailer-had undertaken an obligation to indemnify only that purchaser in case goods were not as
represented. It was believed that a producer should not have the
scope of his responsibility for such a representation enlarged, contrary to his wishes and expectations, to include a duty to compensate
either injured subpurchasers of his buyer or other persons who
might have been harmed by his merchandise.71 While this reasoning
was based on the presumed intent of a contracting seller, it is difficult
to reconcile with the fact that it has long been a common practice
to impose warranties upon vendors by operation of law regardless
of their wishes. 72 Furthermore, today's manufacturer often expects
that his goods will pass through a numb~r of hands before reaching
an ultimate consumer, and thus has reason to anticipate that persons
other than his immediate buyer could be injure~ by defective
merchandise.
A trend toward relaxation of the privity rule in actions for
breach of warranty is apparent from a study of recent cases. Courts
in increasing numbers are allowing an. injured consumer to go beyond his immediate seller and to recover damages from the manufacturer or other persons in the distributive chain through which
the offending merchandise passed.
Apart from the bond of actual privity of contract existing between a buyer of goods and his immediate seller; there are three
other possible categories of relationships between or among potential parties to a products liability suit. For convenience these may
be denoted by the terms vertical, horizontal, and diagonal privity,
although frequently the individuals whose interrelation is desig69. Ibid.
70. See note 2 supra.
71. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 244 (1948 ed.),
.
.
72. Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960); Hawkins
v. Pemberton, 51 N.Y. 198, 10 Am. Rep. 595 (1872); Nielson v. Hermansen, 109 Utah
180, 166 P.2d 536 (1946). But see Wallace v. McCampbell, 178 Tenn. 224, 156 S.W.2d
442 (1941). U.C.C. § 2-313(2) provides that a seller need not have a "specific intention
to make a warranty."
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nated by the use of one of these labels are in no semblance of actual
privity with each other. The following chart illustrates the application of these terms: 73
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FAMILY, FRIENDS, OTHERS
- - - - (H~°iz;;';;ta\ privity) -

A. Vertical Privity
The concept of vertical privity deals with the relationship benveen parties to a transaction occurring in the course of product
distribution prior to a sale to an ultimate purchaser and is therefore
not important in the context of a discussion of consumer protection.74 Indeed, privity is not a significant issue in most cases brought
by one member of the distributive chain against another, because
the litigants are normally in actual privity. This situation may be
attributable to the fact that transactions before a final sale are regularly completed on the basis of contracts providing adequate relief
for an immediate buyer in case a warranty is breached by his immediate seller. In any event, it appears that the current disposition toward
relaxing the traditional application of the privity rule has carried
over into litigation involving parties in the distributive process.
73. This chart is a modified version of the one appearing in Ezer, supra note 38,
at 323.
74. See, e.g., Southwest Ice &: Dairy Prods. Co. v. Faulkenberry, 278 Okla, 278, 220
P .2d 257 (1950).
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In Free v. Sluss, 75 for example, a retailer was allowed to recover
from the manufacturer of a quantity of unmarketable soap for
breach of an express warranty, although the goods had been sold to
the plaintiff by an intermediate dealer. The court held that the
manufacturer's quality guarantee printed on each package of soap
had been addressed to anyone who would deal with the product in
the "usual channels of trade." 76 In this regard, an explanatory comment to one Code provision suggests that the draftsmen were neutral on the question of abrogating the requirement of actual privity
in cases benveen parties in a vertical relationship. 77
B. Horizontal Privity

Code section 2-318 deals with the concept of horizontal privity,
for it relates to the situation where a non-purchaser injured by the
defective product seeks compensation from the final seller of the
product:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of his
buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect
that such a person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
This provision makes specified persons-members of a buyer's family and household, as well as guests in his home-third-party beneficiaries of all warranties running from a final seller to his purchaser,
unless it can be shown that the vendor could not have anticipated
that these persons would be affected by a particular product. Of
course, whether the enactment of section 2-318 in a given state
has meant the expansion of a vendor's liability depends upon the
status of the pre-Code authority in the jurisdiction. While the law
of many states did allow members of a buyer's family and household
to reap the benefit of a seller's warranty to an actual purchaser, this
liberality was generally manifested only in cases where a plaintiff's
injury had been caused by impure food or by a defect in an "imminently dangerous" product.78 By making section 2-318 applicable in
actions arising from injuries caused by almost any type of defective
merchandise, the Code has afforded greater consumer protection in
these jurisdictions. On the other hand, where the privity rule appears to have been abolished or where recovery for product-related
75. 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P.2d 854 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct. 1948).
76. Id. at 937, 197 P.2d at 856; accord, U.S. Pipe &: Foundry Co. v. City of Waco,
130 Tex. 126, 108 S.W.2d 432, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 749 (1937).
77. U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3.
78. Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955); I WILLISTON, SALES
§ 244 (1948 ed.); see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
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injuries can be based on a theory of strict liability in tort, this provision is of less significance.79
Because many products are bought at least partially for the use
or enjoyment of the persons described in section 2-318, there is good
reason to confer upon them the advantages of a buyer's warranty
protection. However, a purchaser often buys a product for the benefit of others standing in special relationships to him. These individuals, including a buyer's employees and guests in his automobile,
are not· explicitly protected by the Code, with the result that its
draftsmen may well be criticized for their somewhat arbitrary stipulation in this provision of the classes of persons who are deemed to
stand in the shoes of a buyer. The problem which section 2-318 in
its present £onµ. fails to solve is perhaps best illustrated by the situation in which a purchaser's employee is injured by defective merchandise·bought for the employee's occupational use. The California
Supreme Court, in the pre-Code case of Peterson v. Lamb Rubber
Co.,80 held that such an employee stood in the shoes of his employer
and thus could recover on a warranty theory from his employer's
seller, despite the lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant.
The court suggested in dicta that its decision might have been the
same had section 2-318 been in effect at the time of the accident, for
the workman could be termed a member of his employer's "industrial family" and thus made one of the third-party beneficiaries
expressly protected by this provision.81 However, a court in Pennsylvania, the first state to adopt the Code, specifically refused to con•
strue section 2-318 to include a purchaser's employee.82 Unless it can
fairly be said that. injured employees are adequately protected by
workmen's compensation legislation, there seems to be no reason to
discriminate against them as the Code thus appears to do. 83
79. Section 2·318 was omitted entirely from the version of the Uniform Commer•
cial Code enacted in California. It is interesting to note that the California Supreme
Court has adopted the theory of a seller's strict liability for injuries caused by a
defective product. See generally Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of
Fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1350 (1966).
80. 54 Cal. 2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575 (1960).
81. Id. at 347, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 869, 353 P.2d at 581. After Peterson, the Uniform
Commercial Code, with § 2-318 deleted, was adopted in California. See generally note
79 supra and accompanying text. In Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42
N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964), on facts very similar to those in Peterson the court
assumed that an employee of the purchaser could maintain an action for breach of
implied warranty, but the trial court's dismissal was affirmed because of a lack of
evidence showing that the product in question had been defective.
82. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), A recent
case suggests a change in attitude on the part of the Pennsylvania courts. Nederostek
v. Endicott-Johnson Shoe Co., 415 Pa. 136, ,202 A.2d 72 (1964) (employee not neccs•
sarily excluded from warranty protection where "supplied" with shoes purchased by
his employer).
83. Two pre-Code cases which have allowed the employee the benefit of a warranty
made to his employer are: Hart v. Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co., 214 F. Supp, 817
(N.D. Ind. 1963); Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1963),
"There is no doubt that the doctrine of privity will be extended, sooner or later, to
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Actually, section 2-318 represents a retreat from the position
espoused by the authors of the 1949 draft of the Code in which they
promulgated a version of this provision which would have extended
the benefit of a seller's warranty to anyone "whose relationship to
[a buyer] is such as to make it reasonable to expect that such person
may use, consume, or be affected by the goods purchased,"84 and thus
would have displaced the privity requirement in a warranty action.
The Colorado and Wyoming legislatures decided that a requirement
of privity would serve no useful purpose in their states, and, therefore,
in enacting the Code substituted for section 2-318 a provision extending a seller's warranty to "any person who may reasonably be
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods." 85 In Virginia,
section 2-318 has been supplanted by an "anti-privity" statute containing language equivalent to that of the Colorado and Wyoming
provisions. 86
In fairness to the draftsmen of the current version of the Code,
it should be noted that the explanatory comment accompanying
section 2-318 suggests that this provision was intended to be neutral
on the question of the application and extension of that pre-Code
case law by which the benefit of a seller's warranty had been conferred upon persons who are not specifically covered by this section.87
However, when by enacting the Code in its present form a legislature has said that a warranty recovery may be had by members of
a consumer's family and household and guests in his home, a court
may rely on the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius and
be reluctant to take its cue from the comment and to extend warranty protection further. 88
include employees of a purchaser. There is no good reason why it should not he so
extended now." Id. at 441, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 140. But see :Barlow v. DeVilbiss Co., 214
F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1963); Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d
399 (1963).
84. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1949 Draft). In 1950, a proposal was made to amend the official
comment to section 2-318 of the 1949 Draft to make it clear that the section extended
a buyer's warranty protection to his employees. However, in order to minimize objection to enactment of the Code not only was this suggestion rejected; but section 2-318
was amended to its present form. U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3 (Proposed Final Draft
1950).
85. Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-318 (Supp. 1965); Colo. Laws. 1965, § 155-2-318.
86. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965); see Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. R.Ev.
814 (1965). Alabama has deleted the words "who is in the family or household of the
buyer or who is a guest in his home" from its version of § 2-318 which will be effective January 1, 1967. UNIFORM LAws ANN., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (Supp.
1965, at 61). California and Utah deleted § 2-318 entirely. CAL. COMM, CODE § 2-318;
UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 70A (1953).
87, U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3 states: "This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. :Beyond this, the section is neutral arid is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend
to other persons in the distributive chain."
88. See Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (not extended to
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An interesting problem of interpretation is presented by the use
of the word "family" in section 2-318 without explanation or qualification. The employment of this term in conjunction with the word
"household" and the phrase "guest in [the buyer's] home" suggests
that it may have been intended to connote an immediate family
group, including only relatives living in the same household. A
Pennsylvania court in Miller v. Preitz.80 seemed to sanction this interpretation when it denied the benefit of section 2-318 to a buyer's
nephew living next door. On the other hand, as noted above, the
California Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to construe the
word "family" broadly enough to include employees of a purchaser,
on the ground that they are members of his "industrial" family. 00
Until recently, courts which even before the enactment of section
2-318 freely extended warranty coverage horizontally to include
members of the family of a buyer of a defective product, his guests,
and even his employees, refused to go so far as to give similar protection to persons more remotely associated with a purchaser-socalled bystanders.91 Early in 1963, however, a Connecticut court
in Connolly v. Hagi 92 allowed a gasoline station attendant to bring
a warranty action against the manufacturer of an automobile which
had rolled over the plaintiff while he was servicing it. ·Pointing out
that the attendant had alleged that he had undertaken to work upon
the car in reliance upon defendant's extensive advertising claims
that the vehicle was safe, the court decided that it would be "unrealistic to protect the wife of the purchaser, his guest in the car, but
not the mechanic to whom he brings the car for purposes of service
guest in buyer's automobile); Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 18'7 A,2d
5'15 (1963) (not extended to employee of purchaser); Miller v. Preitz, 14 Bucks Co. L,R,
1 (Pa. C.P. 1964) (not extended to purchaser's nephew living next door). But see
Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885 (Ark. 1964) where, after pointing
out that in certain instances the defense of privity of contract had been abolished
by section 2-318, the court said that it could see "no sound reason why the employee
or servant of a purchaser using the product in the course of employment as directed,
should be barred from suing on the warranty because of any shield of privily,"
383 S.W.2d at 893; The version of § 2-318 found in the Texas Code provides:
This Article does not provide whether anyone other than a buyer may take advantage of an express or implied warranty of quality made to the buyer or whether
the buyer or anyone entitled to take advantage of a warranty made to the buyer
may sue a third party other than the immediate seller for deficiencies in the
quality of the goods. These matters are left to the courts for their determination,
2 Texas General & Special Laws 1965, ch, '121, at 26 (effective June 30, 1966).
89. 14 Bucks Co. L.R. 1 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
90. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 5'15
(1960). See text accompanying note 81 supra.
91. Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So. 2d 590 (Fla. App. 1962); Hahn v. Ford
Motor Co., 256 Iowa 2'1, 126 N.W.2d 350 (1964); Berzon v. Don Allen Motors, 23 App,
Div. 2d 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1965).
92. 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963). Since this case involved a
suit by a bystander against a manufacturer, it is also relevant to a discussion of
diagonal privity.
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in connection with its operation. " 93 Nevertheless, even in this jurisdiction there is some limitation on a warrantor's responsibility. In
Kuschy v. Norris, 94 decided a year later, another Connecticut court
denied a warranty recovery against a used-car dealer who had sold
an automobile which had collided with plaintiff's car on a public·
highway, allegedly because of defective brakes. As the court observed, the plaintiff was merely a member of the general public and
not "a person who, in the contemplation of the parties to the contract, might be expected to use, occupy or service the used automobile."95 It should be noted that the courts in both Hagi and
Norris determined that the right to warranty recovery depended
upon the nature of a plaintiff's association with an injurious product
rather than upon his relation to its buyer-the factor apparently
considered more significant by the authors of Code section 2-318.
The recent Michigan case of Piercefield v. Remington Arms
Company 96 seems to have made a new departure under the Sales Act
by extending implied warranty protection to a person no more
closely connected with a purchaser of offending merchandise than was.
the plaintiff in Norris. The plaintiff in Piercefield was injured when
the barrel of a shotgun fired by his brother exploded, apparently
because of a defective shell. Although the ammunition had been
purchased by the victim's brother, the court held that the plaintiff
could maintain a warranty action against the retailer, wholesaler,
and manufacturer. of the cartridge. Without defining the possible
limits of warranty coverage, the court merely said that, upon
proof of an injury-causing defect attributable to the manufacturer
of the product, recovery could not be defeated by a defense of lack
of privity. 97 Actually, since the purchaser in Piercefield could probably be considered a member of plaintiff's "family" within the
meaning of section 2-318, plaintiff might have been a third-party
beneficiary under that section had the Code been in effect at the
time of the accident.98 However, the court indicated that the plaintiff had not pleaded his relationship to the buyer and made it clear
93. Id. at 206, 188 A.2d at 887. The court relied on the New Jersey case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), as authority for
the proposition that a guest in the buyer's automobile may recover in a breach of
warranty action. The U.C.C. does not expresssly adopt this view. See generally text
following note 79 supra.
94. 25 Conn. Supp. 383, 206 A.2d 275 (Super. Ct. 1964).
95. Id. at 385, 206 A.2d at 276.
96. 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
97. Id. at 99, 133 N.W.2d at 135.
98. See generally text following note 88 supra. The Uniform Commercial Code
went into effect in Michigan on January 1, 1964; however, the events from which
Piercefield arose occurred before that date and were therefore governed by the Uniform Sales Act then in effect.
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that it would have extended the benefit of the seller's warranty
regardless of the latter's relation to the ultimate purchaser.00
The Colorado, Virginia, and Wyoming anti-privity statutes mentioned above would appear to be authority in those states for expanding warranty coverage to include many bystanders.100 Unlike
section 2-318, these statutes make no mention of a plaintiff's relation
to an ultimate purchaser as a basis for recovery, but require only
that a victim be one who may reasonably have been expected to use,
consume, or be affected by the goods. Although the construction of
these provisions has not yet been settled, their language would seem
to encompass the service station attendant in Hagi, the plaintiff in
Piercefield, and possibly even the motorist on the public highway
who was denied relief in Norris.
C. Diagonal Privity
The question whether a party can recover on a warranty theory
from one with whom his relationship can be characterized by the
term "diagonal privity" is crucial when a plaintiff (usually a buyer)
injured by a defective product seeks compensation from the manufacturer or from someone else in the distributive chain ahead of the
final seller.
,
Courts have invoked a number of fictions in order to avoid the
sometimes harsh effect which would have resulted from the traditional application of the privity rule in diagoncll privity cases.101
Some have held a manufacturer liable on an express warranty theory
on the basis of representations found in his consumer-oriented
advertising or on his product labels, just as if the statements conveyed through these media had been made by him to an ultimate
consumer in a face-to-face transaction.102 Others have allowed a
plaintiff to by-pass a retailer and sue a manufacturer of a defective
product on the theory that the retailer was either an agent of the
manufacturer or a mere conduit for the goods.103 Other courts allow
a person on the consumer level to recover on the basis of implied
warranties arising from transactions between parties in the distributive chain. Some have done this by making exceptions to the strict
application of the privity requirement on behalf of persons injured
by unwholesome food, drugs, and, in some cases, defects in so-called
imminently dangerous products.104 A few courts, such as those which
99. 375 Mich. 85, 99, 133 N.W.2d 129, 135 (1965).
100. See text accompanying notes 85 and 86 supra.
101. See Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 158-54 (1957):
Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1, li6·63
(1963).
102. See cases cited note 27 supra.
103. Rogers v. U.S. Rubber Co., 91 N.H. 398, 20 A.2d 626 (1941); General Motors
Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960).
104. l WILLisrON, SALES § 244 (1948 ed.).
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decided Hagi and Piercefield, have gone so far as to say that a buyer
no longer need be in actual privity with a defendant in the distributive chain in order to recover for the breach of a warranty accompanying the sale of any kind of merchandise. 106
The Second Restatement of Torts suggests that in cases where
the exceptions have swallowed the rule to the extent described
above, the theory has changed from one of contractual warranty to
one of strict liability in tort.106 However, the important issue is not
what theory should be used to explain the demise of the privity
requirement, but rather the extent to which liability should be imposed on the seller of defective merchandise.
,
Since the language of Code section 2-318 deals with a seller's
liability to persons in certain relationships to his buyer, it appeai:s
that this provision is, by its terms, of assistance to those persons
only when they sue a buyer's immediate seller-in the usual situation, a retailer. Therefore, this provision is relevant only in an
action between parties :whose relationship can best be described by
the term "horizontal privity." However, the explanatpry comment
to section 2-318 suggests that the Code's authors did not intend the
provision either to enlarge or to restrict the developing case law
with respect to diagonal privity.107 Nevertheless, another Code section actually appears to have the effect of preventing a court from
finding fictional privity in a suit by an ultimate consumer against
a manufacturer on the basis of representations appearing in his
advertising. Section 2-313(l)(a) states that an express warranty arises
105. See text following notes 92 and 96 supra. See also Vandercook &: Son, Inc. v.
Thorpe, 344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965), where the court observed: ''We now conclude
that under Florida law a manufacturer, as distinguished from the retailer of a product, may be held liable for breach of the implied warranty that the product manufactured is reasonably fit for the purposes intended without regard to whether the
plaintiff is in privity of contract." Id. at 931.
It is interesting to note that most of the recent decisions doing away with the
requirement of privity in warranty actions have been made by federal courts on the
basis of "Erie-educated" guesses regarding the status of the law in a particular state.
See Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, supra (Florida); Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber
Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965) (Indiana); Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d
911 (5th Cir. 1964) (Texas); Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1~63)
(Vermont); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), affd, 304 F.2d 149
(9th Cir. 1962) (Hawaii).
106. 2 REsTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comment m (1965); see Comment,
Products Liability-The Expansion of fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort Liability,
64 MICH. L. REv. 1350, 1369 (1966). See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 910 (1963) (Traynor, J.):
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory
of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agieement but imposed by law, and
the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of, its own responsibility for defective products makes clear that the liability is not one governed by
the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.
107. U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3.
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from an affirmation of fact made by the seller to the buyer, and
thereby suggests that a consumer may not have the benefit of a manufacturer's express warranty unless the consumer purchased from the
manufacturer. Nevertheless, the comment to section 2-313 also indicates that the quoted language was "not designed in any way to
disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized that
warranties need not be confined . . . to the direct parties to such a
contract."108 Thus interpreted, section 2-313 would appear not to
reduce the warranty protection available under the Sales Act, which
authorized a court to find an express warranty in any affirmative
statement made by a seller concerning his goods.100

III. DISCLAIMERS
Although the general trend in recent years has been toward
affording the protection of a manufacturer's or other seller's warranty to an increasing number of persons, it has nonetheless remained possible for a warrantor to limit the nature and the extent
of his warranty obligation.11° The policy favoring the practice of
giving effect to a clause modifying the terms of a warranty or altogether disclaiming any warranty liability which might otherwise be
imposed has traditionally been based on the concept of freedom of
contract-the right of parties to set the terms of their bargain as
they see fit and to have their agreement upheld in court.111 Recently,
however, a growing number of courts have come to recognize that,
in our contemporary marketing system, a writing which evidences
a sale and purports to contain a valid disclaimer or modification
clause is often not the result of actual bargaining between the
parties. Thus, in the leading case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,11 2 the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to recognize
the validity of a disclaimer provision found in the then standard
automotive sales contract, on the ground that the "grossly disproportionate bargaining power" of the automobile manufacturer, acting
through its local dealer, gave the ordinary buyer no real choice but
to accept any limitations on liability laid down by the seller.118
108. U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 2,
109. U.S.A. § 12.
110, See Duesenberg, Manufacturer's Last Stand: The Disclaimer, 20 Bus. LAW, 159
(1964); 77 HARV. L. REv. 318 (1963). U.S.A. § 71 provided: "Where any right, duty or
liability would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may
be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing between
the parties, or by custom, if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the
contract or the sale."
111. Payne v. Valley Motor Sales, Inc., 124 S.W.2d 622, 628 (W, Va. 1962),
112. 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 96 (1960). For a criticism of the case, see Bosh•
koff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Disclaimers and Warranties, 4 B.C. IND, &:
CoM. L. REv. 285, 305-06 (1963).
113. 32 N.J. at 374, 161 A.2d at 78; accord, State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co. v.
Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); Jarnot v. Ford Motor
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Similar, albeit often unexpressed, concern with the imbalance inherent in other transactions was no doubt responsible for the many
pre-Code cases indicating a judicial willingness to scrutinize disclaimer and modification clauses closely and to construe them
strictly.114 In several such cases, a carefully drafted contract provision
was found ineffective on the ground that its language was insufficient to accomplish its intended purpose,115 because it had been
"unfairly procured," 116 or, in the case of a disclaimer, because the
result of enforcing it would have amounted to a failure of the consideration supporting the sales contract of which it was a part.117
While the authors of the Uniform Commercial Code endorsed
the long-standing policy favoring freedom of contract, they at the
same time approved thaf case law holding invalid unconscionable
contract terms.118 Section 2-302 states:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or
it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
This provision, apparently designed to prevent "oppression and
unfair surprise,'' 119 might have been considered a sufficient limitation on a seller's power to incorporate a disclaimer or modification
clause into a sales agreement. However, because the unconscionability test is a vague guideline at best, the Code's draftsmen felt that
the standards to be applied in determining the validity of such a
contract term should be expressly set out, as they are in section
2-316.120 According to the accompanying comment, the purpose of
Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959). See generally Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflicts of Laws, 53 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1072 (1953); Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 629 (1943).
114. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 385-406, 161 A.2d 69,
84-96 (1960).
115. See Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co., 331 Mich. 576, 50 N.W.2d 162 (1951); McPeak
v. Boker, 236 Minn. 420, 53 N.W.2d 130 (1952); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216
N.W. 790 (1927).
116. See International Harvester Co. v. Beam, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S.W. 549 (Ct. App.
1914); Davis Motors, Dodge &: Plymouth Co. v. Avett, 294 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956).
117. See Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1950).
118. As long ago as Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1870), the
Court observed that "if a contract be unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void
for fraud, a court of law will give to the party who sues for its breach damages, not
according to its letter, but only such as he is equitably entitled to."
119. See U.C.C. § 2-302, comment I. See also Comment, 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 401, 421
(1961): "Section 2-302 evidences a realization that a contract is not a signature affixed
to a long printed form but rather a mutual understanding reached through a process
of bargaining."
120. "The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background
and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so
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this provision, like that of section 2-302, is not to prevent a seller
from employing a disclaimer or a modification clause, but rather to
protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained-for provisions.121
In regard to a seller's a,ttempt to vary the terms of an express warranty or to disclaim express warranty liability, section 2-316(1) provides that "words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty
shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other;
but ... negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such
construction is unreasonable."
Since the original proposed draft of this subsection had said
simply that "if the sales agreement creates an express warranty,
words disclaiming it are inoperative,"122 the change to the present
version has been criticized for diluting consumer protection.123
Actually, the current language is rooted in the case law which developed while the Sales Act was in effect. Some courts regularly held
that if an attempted disclaimer of express warranty liability produced a conflict bet\veen t\V'O terms of a sales contract, the conflict
should be resolved by refusing to enforce the disclaimer and by
giving full effect to the term creating the warranty. 124 Furthermore,
if, as the accompanying explanatory comment suggests, the presence
of a disclaimer or modification clause may be evidence concerning
the existence, nature, and extent of an express warranty, the present
language of section· 2-316(1) merely gives vitality to the principle
that express warranties rest on the "dickered" aspects of an individual bargain.125
Once an affirmation of fact or a promise has been made, and is
of a type normally creating an express warranty, it is very difficult,
even under the present section 2-316(1), for the warrantor to restrict
the effect of his representation. I£ the language of a disclaimer or
modification cannot be reconciled with the terms of the warranty,
the disclaimer or modification will be rejected. Furthermore, because the Code has made the warranty of description an express
warranty, a general disclaimer of all warranty liability is impossible;
if such a disclaimer could be fully effective in the face of representations describing the merchandise which became the subject matter
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of
the making of the contract." U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1,
121. U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 1.
122. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1952 ed.).
123. Cudahy, Limitations of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 47
MARQ. L. REv. 127, 131 (1963); Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on
the California Law of Sales, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 281, 310 (1961).
124. See, e.g., Fairbanks, Morse &: Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817
(3d Cir. 1951).
125. Hawkland, Limitations of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
11 HowARD L.J. 28 (1965). See generally U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 1,
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of a bargain, the seller would be under no obligation to deliver
conforming goods. 126
With careful planning, a seller can protect himself to some extent from undesired express warranty liability by employing a written contract intended by the parties to be a final expression of their
agreement. In this way, he can preclude the admission of evidence
showing that an express warranty arose from representations not
contained in the contract.127 However, it is often impractical to reduce a sales agreement to writing and frequently difficult to convince a court sympathetic to a buyer that a purchaser actually intended even a written contract to contain all the terms of a bargain
when some of a seller's affirmations or promises were not included
in the document. Therefore, it is advisable for a seller to make no
representations in his advertising and sales talk that he is unwilling
to warrant as true.
Liability arising from implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose can be disclaimed, and the ordinary terms of these warranties can be varied, by a seller who complies
with the provisions of Code section 2-316(2):
Subject to subsection (3) [discussed below], to e~clude or
modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part
of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of
a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be in writing
and conspicuous.128
·
Section 2-316(2) is an expression of the Code's liberal policy of
allowing a seller to define the nature and scope of any obligation
which he plans to assume, so long as his buyer is aware of the extent
of the seller's intended responsibility.129 By providing that all written disclaimer and modification clauses must be conspicuous in order to be effective, this section prevents a seller from disclaiming
warranty liability and from varying the terms of a warranty by adding a "fine print" clause at the bottom of a contract. The Code
defines a "conspicuous" contract term as one which "is so ·written
that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it," and, more specifically, indicates that language in the
body of a form is "conspicuous" only if it appears in a type style
·or a color causing it to stand out from other printed matter.180 The
requirement that written disclaimers 9r modification provisions
126. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 4; text accompanying note 21 supra.
127. See U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 2; Duesenberg, supra note BO, at 163.
128. This section is said to have been drafted on. the assumption that the implied
warranties exist unless excluded or modified. See U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 5.
129. HAWKLAND, 'TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ']6
(1964).
130. u.c.c. § 1-201(10).
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must be conspicuous should be of significant aid to the average
consumer, who has neither the interest to read nor the sophistication
to understand a sometimes lengthy and technical sales contract.
With the exception of section 2-318, the Code does not expressly
deal with the case where a party brings a warranty action against
a member of a distributive chain with whom he is not in actual
privity of contract.131 An interesting question is whether a manufacturer who included an operative warranty disclaimer or modification clause in a contract with his immediate buyer, such as a
wholesaler, is liable to a subpurchaser, user, or bystander with
whom he is not in privity where, but for the potential effect of the
clause, he would clearly be responsible under local law on a warranty theory irrespective of the lack of privity. It could be argued
that if the privity rule is inapplicable in a particular instance, disclaimers as well as warranties extend beyond the immediate parties
to the sale. This is the theory apparently intended to be employed
in connection with section 2-318, which makes a buyer's family,
household, and guests third-party beneficiaries of a warranty received by the buyer from his immediate seller. These beneficiaries
are said to be bound by the same disclaimers and modifications as
is the buyer himself.182 However, allowing a disclaimer to be binding on all subpurchasers, users, and bystanders raises the specter
that a manufacturer could insulate himself from all warranty liability simply by establishing a corporation to serve as a distributor
and then effectively disclaiming warranty responsibility in connection with each sale to the subsidiary. If a manufacturer could thus
disclaim warranty liability to all subpurchasers and users of his
product, an important reason for relaxing the privity requirement
in warranty actions-finding a more financially responsible defendant-would be lost.188 For this reason, it is doubtful that many
courts will be inclined to reach a strictly logical result when called
upon to determine the validity of a manufacturer's disclaimer in a
diagonal privity context. It should be noted, however, that section
2-316 does not require even a ·written disclaimer or a modification
to be set out in a formal contract, and thus suggests the possibility
that a manufacturer may disclaim warranty liability both to his immediate buyer and to other subpurchasers by means of statements
on the labels of his merchandise or on the packages containing his
goods.
Section 2-316(3) provides basically that, irrespective of a seller's
use of particular words, an implied warranty is automatically ex131. U.C.C. § 2-818, comment 8. Section 2-818 is discussed in the text accompanying notes 78-90 supra.
132. U.C.C. § 2-318, comment I.
133. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
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eluded from a sales agreement, or modified with respect to its terms,
where the circumstances of a transaction would lead a reasonable
buyer to expect such an exclusion or modification. By way of illustration, the Code suggests that a vendor's use of an expression like
"as is" or "with all faults" is sufficient to disclaim all implied warranty liability unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.134 However, since these expressions are supposed to "call the buyer's attention" to the fact that no implied warranties exist, it seems that if
they are in ·writing, they, too, must be conspicuous. 135 It would also
appear that unawareness on the part of a particular buyer, such as
a consumer, of the intended significance of an expression would be
a circumstance indicating that a seller's use of the words was ineffective to disclaim liability. Furthermore, when a buyer has examined
goods prior to sale, or when he has refused to take advantage of the
opportunity to inspect them, there is no implied warranty against
the presence in the merchandise of defects which ought to have
been discovered during the course of an examination undertaken
by one in the buyer's position.136 Because the draftsmen apparently
intended that a purchaser's knowledge and commercial experience
as well as the circumstances of the sale should be taken into account
in considering the effect of his inspection or failure to inspect, it is
unlikely that a consumer buyer will often lose the benefit of an
implied warranty by virtue of his having had an opportunity to.
examine merchandise.137
Section 2-719, allowing parties to modify the ordinary remedies
for breach of contract, permits any conscionable limitation of consequential damages arising from a breach of warranty, but states that
a limitation on consequential damages for personal injury is prima
fade unconscionable. 138 It has thus been suggested that the absence
of any reference to the notion of conscionability in section 2-316
may imply that by incorporating an effective disclaimer, a seller can
automatically preclude liability for personal injury.139 However, this
134. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a); Schneider v. ,Swaney Motor Car Co., 136 N.W.2d 338
(Iowa 1965) (no warranty where used cars were purchased on "as is" and "where is"
basis); see Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964) (language
used to disclaim held ineffective); Yanish v. Femandiz, 397 P .2d 881 (Colo. 1965);
Lafayette Highway Equip. Sales & Serv. v. Dixie Truck & Equip. Serv., 179 So. 2d 479
(La. App. 1965) (language effective); James Talcott, Inc. v. Finley, 389 P.2d 988 (Okla.
1964). "To be effective • • • the disclaimer must call to the attention of the buyer
by clear announcement that the manufacturer and seller reject the implied warranty
which the law raises as an incident to the contract of sale. In effect, it must make
plain that there is no warranty that their product is reasonably suited for use as an
automobile." Willman v. American Motor Sales Co., 44 Erie Co. L.J. 51, 56 {Pa. C.P.
1961).
135. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).
136. u.c.c. § 2-316(3)(b).
.
137. See U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 8.
138. U.C.C. § 2-719(3). See text accompanying note 146 infra.
139. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under
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argument ignores the fact that section 2-302, dealing with unconscionable contract_ terms, is not limited in application to questions
arising under those Code sections in which it is specifically mentioned, but may be used to void any unconscionable contract clause.
Furthermore, by declaring that a limitation on consequential damages for personal injury is prima fade unconscionable, section 2-719
should give content to section 2-302 when the latter provision is used
to test the validity of a warranty disclaimer.
IV.

LIMITATION OF REMEDY

Code section 2-714(1), treating in a general way the remedies
for any breach of contract for the sale of goods where the breach is
discovered after merchandise has been accepted by a buyer, provides
that a purchaser may recover damages for all losses resulting in the
ordinary course of events from the infraction. Section 2-714(2) specifies that the basic measure of damages for breach of warranty is the
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of
the goods in the condition in which they were accepted and the
value that they would have had if they had been as warranted. More
important, section 2-714(3) provides that compensation for incidental and consequential damage may also be recovered; 140 consequential damage includes "injuries to persons or property proximately
resulting from any breach of warranty."141 These Code provisions
were derived without significant change from the Uniform Sales
Act.142

On the other hand, Code section 2-316(4) states that where warranty liability has not been disclaimed, the remedies for breach of
an express or an implied warranty may be limited by agreement of
the contracting parties in accordance with sections 2-718 and 2-719.
Section 2-718 allows the parties to establish a provision in a sales
agreement for reasonable liquidated damages, so long as the amount
payable upon breach is not so large as to constitute a penalty. The
reasonableness of a sum stipulated as liquidated damages is determined in the light of either the harm which could have been anticithe Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 282
(1963).
140. The elements of incidental and consequential damages are described in U.C.C,
§ 2-715.

141. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b). The term "proximately resulting" is not defined in the
Code. However, according to an official comment, if a buyer has discovered a defect
or used a product without making a reasonable inspection, a product-related injury
could be said not to have proximately resulted from a breach of warranty. U.C.C.
§ 2-715, comment 5.
142. See generally U.S.A. §§ 69(6)-(7). Other remedies for breach of a sales
contract are found in U.C.C. §§ 2-711, -713, -717. See HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note
129, _at 229-309. Fqr criticism of the contract remedies provided by the U.C.C., including those for breach of warranty, see Peters, supra note 139.
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pated, at the time of contracting, to result from a breach, or the
harm which did in fact occur. Other factors to be taken into consideration by a court are the difficulty of proving the amount of the
loss and the inconvenience of obtaining an adequate remedy if the
liquidated-damage clause is not enforced.143 These are essentially
the same factors that have always been taken into account by courts
in ruling on the validity of liquidated-damage clauses, although in
the past some courts were reluctant to consider the actual loss attributable to a breach of contract.144 By expressly providing that a,court
may consider the actual-harm factor as well as the possibility that
a particular stipulated damage clause is void as unconscionable under section 2-302, the Code's draftsmen sought to ensure that section
2-718 would not be used to sanction a liquidated damage clause
which unfairly favored either party.
By virtue of section 2-719, the parties to a sale may agree upon
warranty remedies in addition to, or in place of, those specifically provided by the Code. Similarly, they may alter the normal
measure of damages for a breach of warranty. Thus, they may
agree that a seller can satisfy any warranty liability to a buyer by
repairing or replacing defective merchandise.145 Section 2-719 also
permits any conscionable limitation or exclusion of consequential
damages arising from a breach of warranty but, as noted earlier,
explicitly states that the "limitation of consequential damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima fade
unconscionable. " 146
A possi~le anomaly in the application of sections 2-718(3) and
2-719 arises from the fact that neither provision indicates that a
written contract clause modifying or limiting a remedy need be conspicuous, as must its counterpart disclaiming warranty liability or
modifying the terms of a warranty.147 Thus, these provisions do not
seem to go as far as would be desirable in protecting a buyer, particularly a consumer, from unexpected limitations upon a seller's
liability. Of course, any potential unfairness which may result from
the draftsmen's failure to incorporate the requirement of conspicuousness into these two sections can be avoided by resort to section
143. u.c.c. § 2-718(1).
144. Keeble v. Keeble, 85 Ala. 552, 5 So. 149 (1888); Dunlap Pneumatic Tyre Co.,
Ltd. v. New Garage & Motor Co., Ltd., [1915] A.C. 79. See generally WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 783-84 (3d ed. 1961); Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 495, 499-513 (1962). For cases that did not consider the actual-harm
factor, see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907); Berger v. Shanahan, 142 Conn. 726, 118 A.2d 311 (1955); Mead v. Anton, 33 Wash. 2d 741, 207 P.2d 227
(1949).
145. U.C.C. § 2-719(l)(a).
146. It is not clear whether the conscionability requirement also applies to clauses
totally disclaiming warranty liability. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
147. See U.C.C. § 2-316; text accompanying note 130 supra.
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2-302, which authorizes a court to void any unconscionable contract
provision.148
One of the more unfortunate aspects of the warranty law established by the Code is that it was in no way designed to meet the
problem of inequality of bargaining position. Often a product which
is a virtual necessity to modem living is presented to a consumer
on a take-it-as-offered-or-leave-it basis, with the result that any subsequent sale can hardly be said to be the result of actual bargaining.149 It has been argued on the basis of section 2-302 that a buyer's
lack of a meaningful option in such situations may renqer ineffectual an otherwise enforceable contract clause disclaiming or modifying warranty liability or varying the terms of a warranty.150 However,
the explanatory comment to section 2-302 states that the purpose of the provision is "not the disturbance of allocation of risks"
attributable to the superior bargaining power of one of the
parties.151 Therefore, it would appear that if a disclaimer or modification clause is otherwise effective, it is enforceable despite the fact
that, because of the absence of a feasible alternative, a buyer is
forced to accept a disproportionate share of the risk.11i2
A classic example of the type of "adhesion contract" which a
buyer is often forced to sign in order to do business with a dominant
seller is the standard automobile sales agreement, by virtue of which
the extent of a manufacturer's warranty liability is purportedly limited to repairing or replacing defective parts. Furthermore, even
this restricted responsibility is frequently assumed only for a limited
period of time. Traditionally, such limitation provisions have been
valid; for example, a plaintiff whose automobile had been destroyed
by a fire caused by a· defective part was regularly denied recovery
because the manufacturer's liability had been limited to replacement of defective parts or because the applicable warranty had expired before the fire.15a
There is an indication of a recent change in attitude on the part
of some courts toward the standard automobile sales agreement. In
Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co.,154 a Pennsylvania court held that a warranty providing for the replacement of defective parts did not pre148. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-719, comment 1: "[A]ny clause purporting to modify or limit
the remedial provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner is subject to
deletion ••••"
149. See Kessler, supra note 113.
150. Comment, 109 U. PA. L. REY. 401, 420 (1961).
151. U.C.C. § 2-302, comment I.
152. Boshkoff, supra note 112, at 303; Cudahy, supra note 123, at 129; Hawkland,
supra note 125, at 37.
153. Shafer v. Reo Motors, 108 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Hall v. Everett
Motors, 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E.2d 107 (1960); Norway v. Root, 58 Wash. 2d 96, 361
P.2d 162 (1961).
154. 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
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elude the existence of a distinct warranty of merchantability upon
which the plaintiff could rely to recover damages attributable to a
faulty steering mechanism in a truck produced by the defendant.
In an action against another automobile manufacturer and his
dealer to recover for personal injuries sustained while driving an
allegedly defective car, the New Jersey Supreme Court, noting the
defendant's "grossly disproportionate bargaining power," declared
that the manufacturer's "attempted disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability and of the obligations arising therefrom is
so inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudication of its
invalidity. " 165 Nevertheless, although there are strong policy arguments in favor of voiding disclaimer, modification, and limitation
clauses forced upon a buyer by a seller in a vastly superior bargaining position, most courts have enforced these provisions.~66
Perhaps the problems posed by adhesion contracts could best be
solved by legislation declaring disclaimer and limitation clauses ineffective or prima fade unconscionable in particular settings. In this
respect, the North Dakota legislature has enacted a statute providing:
[A]ny person purchasing any gas or oil burning tractor ... for
his own use shall have a reasonable time after delivery for inspection and testing of the same, and if it does not prove to be
reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was purchased, the
purchaser may rescind the sale.... [A]ny provision in any written order or contract of sale . . . which is contrary to the provisions of this section, hereby is declared to be against public
policy.151
This provision gives some measure of protection to farmers, who,
as a class, are in a weak bargaining position in doing business with
farm equipment dealers.168
V.

WARRANTIES IN NoN-SALE TRANSACTIONS

Implied warranties of quality are generally considered to arise
only from sales or contracts to sell. There are, however, other kinds
of transactions in which, as in sales, it is possible for defective prod155. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95
(1960). Although the U.C.C. had not yet been enacted in New Jersey, the court cited
"section 202." It seems apparent from the context that it actually meant to refer to
§ 2-302. It is not clear, however, that the draftsmen of the Code intended § 2-302
to be used merely because one party to a contract was in an extremely favorable bargaining position. See text accompanying note 152 supra. Cases in accord with Henningsen include State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, llO
N.W.2d 449 (1961); General Motors Co. v. Dotson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d
655 (1960).
156. See cases cited note 153 supra.
157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-07 (1960).
158. See Boe v. Tliorbum Herseth, Inc., 13"4 N.W.2d 33 (N.D. 1965).
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ucts capable of causing personal injury, property damage, or economic loss to change hands. These types of transactions should reasonably be expected to give rise to warranties similar to those
normally associated with sales.

A. Bailments for Hire
In the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, a landlord does not impliedly warrant that the premises will be fit for
the lessee's intended use. 159 On the other hand, it is well settled that
a lease of goods gives rise to a warranty that the wares are reasonably
suited to the lessee's intended use if the lessor is aware of use contemplated.160 The reason for imposing such a warranty was suggested
in the recent New Jersey case of Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Loading
b Rental Service, 161 where the court stated that no warranty is implied by law simply because a particular kind of transaction takes
place, but rather for the reason that one party "is in a better position
than the other to know and control the condition of the chattel
transferred and to distribute the losses which may occur because of
a dangerous condition the chattel possesses."162 Cintrone involved a
long-term truck lease under which the lessor had been obligated to
keep the vehicle in repair. However, the court stated that the existence of an implied warranty that the rented vehicle was fit for the
lessee's purpose and that it would remain so was not dependent upon
this service obligation. The court indicated that its reasoning would
be equally appropriate in a case involving the more common shortterm chattel lease.163
With respect to some kinds of goods, renting is almost as commonplace as selling.164 Although Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies only to actual sales of personal property, its draftsmen appear to have seen no reason why warranties may not arise
in connection with other types of transactions, such as bailments for
hire. 165 Like a retailer, a bailor for hire offers articles to the consuming public; 166 indeed, there may be more justification for holding
that implied warranties of quality arise from leases than there is for
159. 51 C.J.S. Landlord o- Tenant § 304 (1947).
160. Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM, L.
REv. 653, 657 (1957); see Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 850, 854 (1959). But cf. Brookshire v.
Florida Bendix Co., 153 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963) (liability of manufacturer on
implied warranty of fitness does not extend to lessee or bailee),
161. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
162. Id. at 445, 212 A.2d at 775.
163. Id. at 434, 450, 212 A.2d 769, 778 (1965).
164. "We may take judicial notice of the growth of renting motor vehicles, trucks
and pleasure cars." Id. at 448, 212 A.2d at 776.
165. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 2.
166. See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Loading &: Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 448, 212
A.2d 769, 777 (1965).
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saying that they arise from sales, since a lessee, especially a shortterm lessee, is more likely than a buyer to rely upon a person with
whom he deals to provide him with a safe product.167

B. Contracts for Service
Under the Sales Act, no "sale" occurred when the ownership of
goods was transferred, pursuant to a service contract and as a necessary incident to the performance of the service.168 This rule appears
to remain unchanged under the Code. For example, in Epstein v.
Giannattesio169 a Connecticut court held that no warranties arise
under the Code with respect to the materials used in giving a beauty
treatment because a beautician renders a ~ervice and does not "sell"
goods.170 However, Code section 2-314(1) expressly designates the
serving of food and drink as a sale for the purpose of implying a
warranty of merchantability.171 Even before the advent of the Code,
the great majority of American jurisdictions had already rejected
the dictum-become-law of Parker v. Flint 172 that an innkeeper or
restaurateur "utters," rather than sells, the food on his menu and
consequently is not bound by the law of implied warranty.173
In the leading case of Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 174 a
New York court held that a hospital's furnishing blood to a patient
was not a transaction giving rise to implied warranties. The rule of
this much criticized decision has apparently been followed by every
court which has had the opportunity to consider the issue175 and has
become the basis of legislation in several states.176 On the other hand,
167. Id. at 456, 212 A.2d at 781; see Farnsworth, supra note 160, at 665.
168. See Foley Corp. v. I;,ove, 101 A.2d 841 (D.C. Munic.· App. 1954) (construction
of wall); Sam White Oldsmobile Co. v. Jones Apothecary, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 834 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960) (repair of automobile); I WILLISTON, SALES ~ 9(b) (1948 ed.).
169. 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (County C.P. 1963).
170. But see Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A.2d 189 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Err. 1965), where
on facts identical to those in Epstein, the court held that plaintiff had stated a cause
of action for breach of warranty even though the transaction did not constitute a sale.
171. U.C.C. § 2-314(1); see Ray v. Deas, 112 Geo. App. 191, 144 S.E.2d 468 (1965).
172. 12 Mod. 254, 88 Eng. Rep. 1303 (K.B. 1699). See generally 38 NoTRE DAME LAw.
92 (1962).
173. Prosser indicates that only six states-Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland,
New Hampshire, and Tennessee-have adhered to Parker v. Flint in recent times.
PROSSER, TORTS § 95, at 655 (3d ed. 1964); see Farnsworth, supra note 160, at 660-62.
174. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
175. For criticism of the rule, see 69, HARV. L. REv. 391 (1955); 103 U. PA. L. REv.
833 (1955). The rule has been followed in the following cases: Whitehurst v. American
Nat'l Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War
Memorial Blood Bank, 132 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. Super. 1965); Krom v. Sharpe &: Dohme,
Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 761, 180 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1958); Dibblee v. Dr. R. W. Groves Latter
Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961).
·
It is clear that an express warranty can accompany a blood transfusion. See Napoli
v. St. Peter's Hosp., 213 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
176. .ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (1965); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 106, § 2-316(5)
(1963) (incorporated into the U.C.C. as enacted in Massachusetts); CAL. HEALTH &:
SAFETY CODE § 1623.
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warranties have been held to attach to the administration of defective drugs. In the California case of Gottsdanker v. Gutter Laboratories,177 two children contracted poliomyelitis shortly after they had
been inoculated with Salk vaccine manufactured by the defendant
and administered by their physician. Although the court found that
there had been no "sale" at the time of the inoculation, it held the
manufacturer liable for breach of the implied warranty that had
arisen when the defendant sold the vaccine to its distributor.17 8
While there may be a sufficient distinction between the dispensation
of vaccine and of blood to justify calling only the former a sale, it is
probably a public policy favoring hospitals over drug manufacturers
which leads to the anomalous dichotomy.
It has been suggested that in dealing with cases involving goods
transferred as part of the performance of a service, it would be better
to reason by analogy to sales law rather than calling the passage of
title a sale. 179 In this respect it should be noted that section 2-314
of the Code, which defines the implied warranty of merchantability,
does not make the serving of food a sale of goods for all purposes,
but provides only that "under this section the serving for value of
food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere
is a sale."180
Even if the particular transaction in which an injured consumer
received defective goods is not treated as a sale giving rise to a warranty, recovery may nevertheless be based, as it was in Gottsdanker,
on a warranty created at the time of some prior transaction, which
actually was a sale, involving the same goods. Of course, this result
is possible only in a jurisdiction where a plaintiff is not barred by
the privity rule from bringing a breach of warranty action against
someone in the distributive chain other than the person who transferred the defective product to the plaintiff. For example, in Putman
v. Erie City Manufacturing Co., 181 a federal court, declaring that
the privity rule no longer existed in Texas, held that an injured
plaintiff could maintain an action against the manufacturer of a
defective wheel chair, although the victim had rented the device
from a local drugstore.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Warranty theory has long stood out among the legal doctrines
pertinent to a discussion of products liability as the one providing
177. 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
178. But see Berry v. American Cyanamide, 341 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1965), where
the court, applying Tennessee law, denied recovery on similar facts because of a lack
of privity between the plaintiff and the defendant manufacturer.
179. Farnsworth, supra note 160, at 667.
180. U.C.C. § 2-314(1). (Emphasis added.)
181. 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
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the greatest opportunity for a buyer and a seller to allocate freely
among themselves the potential risk of loss attributable to personal
injury, property damage, or economic harm caused by substandard
merchandise. In order to make the law of warranty compatible with
modern social policy favoring broad consumer protection, the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code restricted to a considerable
extent this freedom to apportion. On balance, however, even under
the Code it remains possible for manufacturers and other sellers to
pass a significant portion of the risk on to their customers. Indeed,
the Code demonstrates only a feeble attempt to come to grips with
the dominant feature in so many situations in which the major share
of the risk is allotted to the purchaser-the disproportionate bargaining positions of the parties. However, recent cases show that the
courts have been attempting to alleviate this problem, and much
attention has been focused upon the result of their efforts-the
emerging doctrine that a producer or distributor can be strictly
liable in tort for much of the harm caused by defective products. 182
Nevertheless, in several ways the warranty provisions of the Code
may be a more desirable basis of recovery than the strict tort theory.
A plaintiff may recover for breach of a warranty of merchantability
if a product is merely unfit for the ordinary purpose for which goods
of that type are used, whereas he is entitled to relief on the strict
tort theory only if a product was "defective"-a term meaning unreasonably dangerous to persons or property. 183 This definition of
a defect not only presents problems of proof, but also precludes a
strict tort recovery on behalf of a plaintiff who suffers a financial loss
unaccompanied by personal injury or property damage.184
Even one injured by a product which was defective in the strict
tort sense may prefer to frame his case against his seller in terms of
breach of warranty in order to take advantage of a longer statute of
limitations.185 Code section 2-725 establishes a four-year statute of
limitations on a cause of action for breach of contract186-a period
considerably longer than the typical one- to two-year interval within
which a tort suit for personal injuries must be commenced.187 How182. See generally Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1350 (1966).
183. 2 R.Esl'ATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (1965).
184. Id., comment d; see Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 8, 403 P.2d 145
(1965); Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965). But see Santor v. A &: M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (consumer recovered against manufacturer for
defective rug).
185. E.g., George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1964).
186. Before the enadment of the Code, most states had equally long or longer statutes
of limitations on contract actions. See Freedman, Products Liability Under the Uniform
Commercial Code in New York and Other States, 19 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 178, 191
n.38 (1964). Section 2-725 also provides that the period may be shortened to a period
as short as one year by agreement, but may not be extended.
187. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965).
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ever, this provision cuts both ways, for while the Code provides a
comparatively long period for bringing contract claims, it also stipulates that this period commences when a breach occurs, which, in the
case of a typical warranty, is at the time of tender of delivery.188 If
a buyer is injured after the statute has run, he is barred from maintaining a warranty action regardless of whether he knew before the
• expiration of the statute that a breach of warranty had occurred.180
On the other hand, the statute of limitations on a tort action begins
to run at the time of the injury.190 In reality, it is unlikely that a
defect in a product at the time of sale would not be discovered
within four years. Furthermore, in the case of a warranty relating to
future performance of a product, the Code provides that a cause of
action accrues when a breach should have been discovered.191

William C. Pelster
188. U.C.C. § 2-725(2); see McMeekin v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 223 F. Supp. 896,
899 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
189. u.c.c. § 2-725(2).
190. Annot., 4 A.L.R.!!d 821 (1965).
191. U.C.C. § 2-725(2). An example of a warranty of this type is one relating to
the germination of seeds. see, e.g., Bell v. Menzies, 110 Ga. App. 432, 138 S.E.2d 781
(1964); Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of
Sales, 8 U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 281, 333 (1961).
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